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Autism = death
The social and medical impact of a catastrophic medical 
model of autistic spectrum disorders
Mitzi Waltz
Autism Centre for Education and Research School of Education, University of 
Birmingham
This discussion interrogates the continuing impact of the pervasive and persistent usage of 
debilitating metaphors perpetuating ‘historical’ superstitions, myths and beliefs surrounding 
disability. This article examines the real-life consequences of the power exercised through the 
deployment of derogatory metaphors and their very real effects on care and treatment deci-
sions. The article illuminates how diagnostic categories and their associative metaphors work 
to situate boundaries of normality with pathologising difference. It concludes by demonstrating 
the catastrophic effect of the metaphoric dehumanisation of autistics that has recently culmi-
nated in murder being euphemistically referred to and condoned as ‘mercy killing’.
A diagnosis of autism can be like a living death, for a child may look normal but exist in 
a state of limbo.
These words were not written by Bruno Bettelheim in the 1950s. They are from 
a 1999 article by a respected psychologist, Dr Bryna Siegel, which carries the 
intriguing title ‘Dispelling myths about autism’.
 There are so many myths about autism that a single article could hardly do 
the topic justice. Unfortunately, Siegel’s article perpetuates one particularly 
resilient myth: that people who carry the label of an autistic spectrum disorder 
are something other than fully human and fully alive. In this discussion, I will 
explore the roots, expression, and effects of this myth.
 According to Colin Barnes, ‘“disability” refers to a complex system of social 
constraints imposed on disabled people by a highly discriminatory society’, con-
straints based on ‘superstition, myths, and beliefs from earlier less enlightened 
times. [These ideas] are inherent to our culture and persist partly because they 
are constantly reproduced through the communications media’ (Barnes, 1992: 
5). Among the ‘superstitions, myths and beliefs’ that have contributed to the for-
mation of modern discourses about autism are the idea of the unclean or pos-
sessed body, as expressed in biblical and other texts; the myth of the changeling, 
which was common to many European cultures; and superstitions attached to 
monstrosity, particularly as regards the supposedly definitional human charac-
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teristic of oral speech, and the anxiety our culture attaches to its absence.
 I would add to this list the concept of the ‘normal’ or ‘ideal’ human being, 
a construction that was first put forward in Greek times with the advent of 
structured classification systems, and codified ever more tightly since the 
Enlightenment. The normal or ideal is necessary as a standard against which 
(for example) uncleanness, impairment, and degrees of non-humanness can 
be measured. Indeed, it is only through the identification and rejection of the 
abnormal and less than ideal that these concepts can be constructed at all.
 These ideas have been part of human spiritual and cultural beliefs through-
out recorded history. Indeed, Barnes is rather optimistic in attributing them to 
‘earlier less enlightened times’ (Barnes, 1992: 5). The core narratives of medi-
cine and its corollary discipline, psychology, have come to embrace many old 
myths, including these. The construction of autism as a disability is only one 
lens through which these myths can be observed in action today.
 The language of autism and the narratives in which it is used function to 
construct distorted representations of autism and of people with the charac-
teristics we call autism. This is significant, because it is through narratives, rep-
resentations and discourses that cultures construct and transmit meanings. As 
Stuart Hall writes, ‘meanings also regulate and organize our conduct and prac-
tices – they help to set the rules, norms and conventions by which social life is 
ordered and governed. They are also, therefore, what those who wish to govern 
and regulate the conduct and ideas of others seek to structure and shape’ (Hall, 
1997: 4). Although the distortions inherent in current discourses of autism are 
often not innately malicious – most are simply expressions of incomplete know-
ledge – one function of these distortions is the exercise of power. They convey 
the power to include or exclude, to ignore or treat, and even to control or harm, 
first by positioning autism as a medical condition in need of a cure and, second 
by rendering its ‘sufferers’ less than fully human.
 Autism has been constructed as a medical condition defined by what Lorna 
Wing has termed a ‘triad of impairments’ (Wing and Gould, 1979: p?) affecting 
social and emotional development, behaviour, and flexibility of thought. No 
one who has worked with autistic people would deny that some individuals 
designated as having ASDs do experience impairments, although the extent 
and cause of these is often unclear. An inability to communicate verbally, for 
example, is not an impairment if the person can use a robust alternative strategy, 
such as sign language or an assistive communication device. Lack of flexibility 
can be accommodated in stable environments.
 However, the impairments connected to autism trouble some very basic ideas 
about what it is to be human. What, after all, divides humans from chimpan-
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zees? Both use tools, live in family groups, and communicate in some way with 
the members of those groups. The difference in our DNA is tiny; we are prey to 
many of the same illnesses. Humans, however, speak – or so say linguists such 
as Noam Chomsky, who claim that the capacity for verbal speech is hard-wired 
into our brains (Chomsky, 1957). Humans who do not or cannot speak chal-
lenge this definition, doubly so when there is no easily observed organic cause 
for the difference, such as injury to the speech apparatus or deafness. When 
faced with a non-verbal person with autism, the lack of speech has bothered 
many people so greatly that the person cannot be seen as human.
 We also like to believe that humans are social in ways that animals are not. We 
hold that there is a standard level of ‘relatedness’ present in all normal humans. 
Because the behaviour of people with autism, and especially young children 
with autism, challenges this assumption, our society finds it especially difficult 
to accept. As demonstrated by the quotation from Bryna Siegal that opened this 
discussion, metaphors of ferality, monstrosity, inhumanness, zombification or 
even death are commonplace in narratives of autism, and are particularly tied 
to the issue of social behaviour. To provide a few further examples, Bettelheim 
described children with autism as being ‘dehumanised’ (1967: 7) and ‘animal-
like’ (1967: 360), while Frances Tustin called them ‘monsters’ (Tustin, 1992: 13).
 Our culture currently demands greater degrees of flexibility from people than 
ever before in human history. Globalisation requires physical, linguistic, and 
cultural mobility of workers; modern working practices require multi-tasking, 
lifelong learning, and an affinity for teamwork. Individuals who find it hard to 
meet these new standards – people like you and me, perhaps, not just people 
on the autistic spectrum – can find it hard to cope. I would argue, though, that 
lack of flexibility would not have posed much of a social or personal problem 
during most of the human past. The definition of it as not just a social and 
personal problem, but an actual medical problem, is an indicator of a changing 
definition of what it is to be normatively human.
 Monsters, as Tustin’s use of the word to describe children with autism indi-
cates, are beings that trouble the border between human and animal, living and 
dead. Societies construct their own monsters based on what they fear most, and 
their concept of normality. In ancient times we feared capricious acts of God, 
natural disasters, and the machinations of demons and other unseen sources. 
Because oral speech is one of the most obvious dividing lines between humans 
and our simian cousins, lack of oral speech has frequently been seen as an 
especially troubling difference, and culturally specific explanations have been 
sought and found. As Rosemarie Garland Thomson writes: ‘disability … is the 
attribution of corporeal deviance – not so much a property of bodies as a prop-
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erty of cultural rules – about what bodies should be or do’ (Thomson, 1997: 6).
 It is notable that of the six cases of ‘demonic possession’ discussed in some 
detail in the New Testament of the Bible, two concerned mute people (Mat-
thew 9:32-34 and Luke 11:14-26; Matthew 12:22-28). The creator of ‘monsters’ in 
these stories was an outside, unknowable force to be battled through spiritual 
intervention. Later on, advances in medical knowledge relocated the source of 
the ‘problem’ to within the mute body, to be controlled and combated through 
medical technologies.
 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, mechanisation was a core social 
fear. It is a fairly short trip from Frankenstein’s monster to Bettelheim’s ‘Joey 
the Mechanical Boy’ (Bettelheim, 1967: 233–339). Indeed, Bettelheim made 
these parallels explicit when he stated that ‘[the] typical modern delusion is of 
being run by an influencing machine’ and that ‘in this sense Joey’s story might 
also be viewed as a cautionary tale’ (Bettelheim, 1967: 234). So when Bettelheim 
described Joey as ‘a complex machine’ and a ‘boy-machine’ (1967: 235), ‘a robot’ 
(1967: 236) and ‘a machine-powered body’ (1967: 261), it was a construction that 
tapped into culturally specific social anxieties about humanness.
 This is not a fear that has disappeared, as a quick look at popular representa-
tions of autism demonstrates. The figure of autism is most frequently deployed 
in science fiction or speculative fiction, a genre that routinely explores notions 
of humanness and has actually dealt reasonably sensitively with autistic char-
acters. Still, it is interesting that characters with autism in this genre are often 
used in the way other authors might employ robots, cyborgs, androids or aliens. 
If, as Keith Piper outlines, ‘the android’s concealed mechanical body makes it a 
metaphor for the other, able to masquerade as a member of the dominant norm 
… [it] can thus be seen as activating metaphorical anxieties about such spect-
ers as the infiltrator, the fifth columnist, the “red under the bed,” the closet-
dwelling sexual other, the “international Jew,” and the “white nigger”’ (1991: 97), 
people with autism cut an even more troubling figure in narratives exploring 
the boundaries of humanness. Unlike the ‘human-like’ android, which can at 
least be revealed as a manufactured creation, they are ‘inhuman’ only in the 
sense of being defined as such by dominant notions of normality.
 Not all such characters may be intended purely as metaphor, of course. Just 
as depictions of cyborgs, androids and robots in print and film fictions also 
address our uneasy relationships with the machines and computerised systems 
that share our planet, these depictions of autism may at times be explorations of 
our uneasy relationship with people who have autism or other neurological dif-
ferences. Elizabeth Moon’s The Speed of Dark (2002) is a very worthy example 
of this possibility.
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 Old fears continue to find expression in representations of autism, but new 
ideas about monstrosity are emerging. As we conquer the secrets of the human 
genome and apply technology to the most basic processes of life, such as creat-
ing embryos in the laboratory, our latest monsters are those whose genes seem 
to threaten the possibility of perfection.
 Currently, the majority of funds spent on autism research are attached to gen-
etic studies. There will be no discovery of an ‘autism gene’, however, although 
patterns may be discerned, and pre-natal tests for ‘risk’ developed (Muhle et 
al., 2004). Already adults with autism are warning that the most likely outcome 
of genetic testing, as seen in Down’s syndrome, will be pressure to terminate 
pregnancies that might result in autistic children. Because the multiple genes 
involved are apparently quite common, and because the autistic spectrum is 
so broad, this process will threaten the lives of the potentially quite functional 
as well as the severely impaired. The title of a recent mass-media article on the 
topic – ‘Would you have allowed Bill Gates to be born?’ (Caplan, 2005) – pro-
vides a vivid sketch of how far this process has gone.
 The mainstreaming of a catastrophic medical model of autism reaches its 
apotheosis in discussions of the alleged ‘autism epidemic’, often dressed up with 
descriptors such as ‘alarming’, ‘disaster’ and ‘catastrophe’. To provide just one 
quotation, Rick Rollens, a California political operative and parent of a son 
with autism whose advocacy was instrumental in starting the nation’s largest 
autism research centre, said: ‘The hordes of autistic children are here. The social 
and fiscal disaster that is the autism epidemic is upon us. God help us’ (Rollens, 
2004).
 Ever-increasing social atomisation also causes anxiety, with autism deployed 
as both metaphor and example. In the online journal Literary Kicks, Levi Asher 
(2005) muses that ‘autism might be the metaphor for our new millennium, or at 
least our new millennium’s first decade’. In an essay that brings Sontag’s writing 
on AIDS as the metaphor that characterised social anxieties in the 1980s to bear 
on Mark Haddon’s 2003 novel, The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-
Time, Asher writes:
The autistic response is a response many of us have used in certain situations. Block out the 
intruder. Strangers are dangerous. Touch is bad. Change is scary. Barriers are important. Mys-
terious forces control us, and only our routines and our rituals keep us safe. (Asher, 2005)
This idea of autism as a metaphor for an increasingly fragmented, disconnected, 
and dissociative society is interesting, but it is also based on a poor understand-
ing of autism as it is actually experienced. As Asher and those who commented 
on his Literary Kicks piece noted, however, it is a metaphor whose use is increas-
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ing: related neologisms include ‘post-autistic economics’ and ‘momentary 
autism’. It also refers back to Erich Fromm and others who spoke of modern, 
technological society in terms of ‘schizophrenia’ or ‘autism’ over 30 years ago.
 Another commentator, Harvey Blume of MIT, suggests a different reason for 
popular culture’s recent romance with autism. ‘The media is stuck on autism 
because of the zeitgeist,’ he wrote. ‘And the zeitgeist, in turn, at least for now, 
seems never to stray too far from the Internet … the mental processes of autis-
tics can stand in as symbols of the associative hyper-linking graphic chaos of 
the World Wide Web’ (Blume, 2004). Blume goes on to consider the possibil-
ity that these representations are actually closely related to representations of 
cyborgs, but with the difference that they suggest human beings are themselves 
changing to meet new technologies. We aren’t being rewired per se; we are per-
haps discovering that some of us are already differently wired, and coming to 
value that difference – or being frightened or intrigued by these newly revealed 
differences, as the case may be. Blume’s representation is also reminiscent of 
clinical psychologist Erich Fromm’s (1973) deployment of autism in his descrip-
tion of the ‘cybernetic man’, alienated and robot-like, of whom he considered 
the autistic person to be the epitome.
 Some might argue that these representations of autism are only fictions, after 
all, and deserve little serious attention. This kind of dismissal is problematic. As 
Maria Truchan-Tataryn has argued, fictional portrayals ‘slip out of imaginary 
discourse to shape the perception and reception of real individuals with dis-
abilities and, in turn, translate into policy which further defines and confines 
lives and lifestyles’ (Truchan-Tataryn, 2003: 207).
 Autism becomes ‘storied’ through its depiction in popular culture, as well 
as in the pages of medical texts. In an examination of how Hollywood depic-
tions of the Vietnam War produced certain ways of thinking about the war, John 
Storey points to how discourses that become part of a society’s ‘regime of truth’ 
may exert power. In the case of these film narratives, a particular discourse 
migrated from popular culture to political rhetoric and ideology, replacing or 
guiding the reinterpretation of other discourses (Storey, cited in Grainge, 2003: 
99–119). This has certainly happened with the medicalised discourse of autism, 
and may happen in future with other discourses of autism.
 Sometimes the way disability is narrativised in popular culture is part of a 
deliberate attempt to change the nature of public discourse. Paul Darke (1999) 
and others have pointed out how film representations of disability in Nazi Ger-
many were employed to change public opinion about murdering people with 
disabilities. Darke directs the reader’s attention to Ich Klage An [I Complain], 
a 1941 film in which a young disabled woman begs the State to kill her, and 
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becomes a heroine when she succeeds. He notes that popular culture products 
affect? people with disabilities as well as general audiences. They make a differ-
ence in how people feel about themselves, as well as what they believe about and 
do to others.
 Truchan-Tataryn looks at possible links between representations of disability 
in Canadian literature and ‘a eugenic strain’ (2003: 209) within it being expressed 
in relation to the so-called ‘mercy killing’ of Tracy Latimer, a 12-year-old with 
cerebral palsy, in 1993. This line of thought can be extended to representations 
of autism. In 2001, the Autism Society of Canada reported that 50 per cent of 
the disabled children murdered by their parents in the previous five years were 
autistic (Simmermon, 2001). If Truchan-Tataryn’s analysis is correct, label-
ling people with autism as unworthy of life may have had some truly horrific 
effects.
 Fundamentally, to conceive of autism as always denoting impairment and 
deviance means relegating people with autism to a subordinate position: to dis-
able them, whether the condition itself has caused functional impairment or 
not. As Gleidman and Roth (1980, cited in Fine and Asch, 1988: 12) put it, ‘the 
label of disability carries with it such a powerful imputation of inability to per-
form any adult social function that there is no other descriptor needed by the 
public’. Such labelling is a political act, in that it ignores the role of environment, 
social practice, and social beliefs in the construction of both ‘autism’ specifically 
and disability in general. If, as Davis writes, ‘the disabled body is not a discrete 
object, but rather a set of social relations’ (1995: 11), the effect of prevailing ideas 
about autism has generally been to hide the set of social relations that actually 
defines ‘autism’ behind a smokescreen of medicalised discourse.
 Individuals on the autistic spectrum who are able to recognise the power 
differentials mobilised by medicalised discourses experience great difficulty in 
challenging them, even when they are able to launch articulate responses. For 
those who experience very significant impairment due to ASDs, such as people 
with learning difficulties and severe communication impairments, being posi-
tioned as less than human has been even more dangerous.
 Dehumanisation of people with autism, whether it comes through compari-
sons with robots, disease analogies, or discussions of genetic ‘risk’, has very real 
effects on care and treatment decisions. For example, although the use of overt 
behaviour modification techniques on humans became somewhat taboo fol-
lowing World War II, even theorists who attacked the work of B. F. Skinner 
seemed unconcerned about the continuing use of such methods on animals 
and ‘subnormal’ children, in particular children with autism.
 Ivar Lovaas pioneered the use of such methods at the University of California 
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at Los Angeles (UCLA). His work first came to the attention of the general public 
through a profusely illustrated article in Life magazine entitled ‘Screams, Slaps 
and Love’ (Moser and Grant, 1965). It opens with the lines: ‘Enraged bellows at 
the boy, then a sharp slap in the face. This deliberate, calculated harshness is 
part of an extraordinary new treatment for mentally crippled children’ (Moser 
and Grant, 1965: 90). Lovaas himself is shown administering an electric shock 
to a nine-year-old girl, ‘to give her something to be anxious about’ (Moser and 
Grant, 1965: 93). The language of the article seems extreme, but it simply echoes 
what had already been said by the biggest names in the field of autism research. 
‘Billy’, on whom the article concentrates, is described as ‘uncontrollable’, ‘dia-
bolically clever’, and even as ‘a Frankenstein monster’ (Moser and Grant, 1965: 
96). Against such an implacable, inhuman enemy, what is a slap, or even an 
electric shock?
 The picture changes if dehumanisation is refused. As one organisation oppos-
ing these practices has declared:
The use of aversives is a human rights issue and a civil rights issue. When we allow pun-
ishments to be used on persons with disabilities which would be illegal if used on persons 
without disabilities, we are denying them equal protection under the law. Even our other 
devalued populations – people who are elderly, homeless, or in prison – cannot legally be 
‘treated’ with aversives, nor do we permit animals to be trained or treated by these means. 
(Autism National Committee, 1999)
The National Institute of Mental Health funded another intriguing study at 
UCLA in 1971. A severely neglected and deprived ‘wild child’ known as Genie, 
who was not autistic but displayed similar impairments due to her experiences, 
was studied by researchers curious about whether Skinner or Chomsky had 
been right in the debate on human language (Rymer, 1993). Lovaas’s lab was 
close by on the same university campus, and he had a well-known interest in 
children like Genie. Many years later, a lecturer researching the Genie case 
enquired as to why Lovaas had not been brought in to assist with the study. She 
was told by UCLA linguist Susan Curtiss, who had been a member of the ori-
ginal research team, that ‘the team felt that Dr. Lovaas’ approaches were not well 
suited to Genie who required nurturance, affection, love, and an opportunity 
to experience the world’ (Gadbois, 2001). It was apparently a given that such 
niceties were not required by children with autism.
 Lovaas’s research group no longer condones the use of pain-based aver-
sives, instead concentrating on the use or denial of positive reinforcement for 
desired behaviour. Unfortunately for people with autism and related condi-
tions, aversives have not gone out of style in some places, and denial of posi-
tive reinforcements can also have tragic consequences. For example, in 1995 
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the Massachusetts Department of Mental Retardation forced an overhaul of 
procedures after a 19-year-old girl with learning difficulties apparently starved 
to death when the ‘positive reinforcer’ of food was denied her by personnel at a 
residential care centre (Autism National Committee, 1995).
 Despite parent enthusiasm for his methods, Lovaas has said and written 
some quite troubling things over the years. On several occasions he has equated 
humanness with normality, as in the following quotation from a 1974 article in 
the popular psychology magazine Psychology Today: ‘You have a person in the 
physical sense – they have hair, a nose and a mouth – but they are not people in 
the psychological sense. One way to look at the job of helping autistic kids is to 
see it as a matter of constructing a person. You have the raw materials, but you 
have to build the person’ (Chance, 1974: 76).
 Acceptance of dehumanising representations of autism may have had other, 
deadly consequences. ‘Mercy killings’ of people with autism by their caregivers 
are, sadly, more common than one would like to think (Palermo, 2003). Such 
crimes are almost never punished, because the victims are represented in ways 
that devalue them as human beings but make it easy to pity and sympathise with 
their carers (see McKim, 2002, for a recent example of this phenomenon). Typ-
ically, the social context of inappropriate or non-existent support for people with 
autism and their families is not addressed as part of the response. Two websites 
(Smith, 2005, and Seidel, 2006) were available at the time of this writing that list 
such murders, with information about the almost uniformly light sentences (if 
any) given to the perpetrators.
 Creating fears of ‘hordes’ of diseased burdens on the state allows, perhaps even 
demands, the use of heroic measures to combat the menace. Yet when Catherine 
Maurice (2000) makes the argument: ‘Yes, aiming for and achieving recovery 
from autism is expensive. So is chemotherapy. So is a lifetime of state-supported 
custodial care. Why would we not attempt to recover anyone from cancer, or 
autism?’ the discussion is not pursued. When autism is equated with life-threat-
ening diseases or devastating natural disasters, the response is sadly predictable.
 In summary, the identification of autism with self-loss, otherness and dehu-
manisation pervades the dominant, medicalised discourse of autism. These 
descriptors say little about the nature of autism, and expose people so diagnosed 
to a higher risk of degrading and potentially dangerous treatment. They also 
pose a risk to all of us, because these representations of people with autism have 
been entwined from their very beginning with an effort to define what it is to be 
normatively human, and act to constrain the boundaries of acceptable human 
variation.
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